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U The Inflation Tax and the
Marginal Welfare Costin a
World of Currency and Deposits
OW HIGH IS THE OPTIMAL rate ofinfla-
thin? The answer depends on the range of
benefits and costs associated with inflation that
are considered by the monetary authority in
choosing the inflation rate. For example, if one
considers the effects of inflation on the distribu~
tions of income and wealth, its interactions with
the tax code or the transition cost ofchanging
the expected rate of inflation, or if one adopts
the alternative perspectives of different economic
agents, the benefits and costs can be relatively
largeand difficult to assess. This article abstracts
from transitory and largely avoidable aspects of
inflation, and focuses instead on the fundamental
public finance aspects ofthe monetary authority’s
problem. In this case, the net benefits and costs
are those associated with an inflation rate that is
perfectly anticipated; the benefit of inflation that
accrues to the monetary authority (typically the
government) is the revenue from inflationary
money creation. This benefit is analogous to the
revenue arising from a specific tax on any other
good or service.
Inflation imposes a tax on money holdings
because it is the rate at which individuals lose
the purchasing power of a dollar. To lower the
total cost ofholding money, individuals change
their holdings and their use ofmoney when
inflation rises. Their efforts to do so, however,
reduce their total services from real money
balances, thereby lowering individuals’ real
income. This loss is the welfare cost of inflation.
The optimal rate of inflation is found by corn-
paring the marginal welfare cost of revenue from
inflation with the marginal cost of alternative
sources ofrevenue. An efficient system oftax
collection minimizes the welfare cost of a given
flow of tax revenue; this requires that the inflation
rate must be chosen sothat the marginal cost per
dollar ofrevenue from inflation is the same as the
marginal cost of alternative sources of revenue.
In the analysis below, these concepts are devel-
oped for models involving a money stock made
up of currency only, competitively priced bank
deposits only, and a mix of both. The differences
in each case clarify the analysis as well as provide
some insightinto the implications of the analysis
for the optimal inflation rate.
THE MARGINAL WELFARE COST OF
REVENUE FROM MONEY CREATION:
THE CURRENCY CASE
Almost two decades ago, it was shown that a
simple formula provides a method ofcalculating
the additional welfare cost of collecting a dollar
of revenue from money creation. This measure
is the ratio of the marginal welfare cost ofinflation68
to the marginal revenue from a change in antici-
pated inflation) To derive this formula, assume
the only money is currency and that the demand
for real money balances depends only on the
nominal rate of interest, holding other influ-
ences constant:
(1) m=ça(i)
The welfare loss, W, is
(2) W=Jco(x)dx-ico(i),
and the marginal welfare loss from a rise in
inflation, it, is reflected in the incremental loss
from a rise in the nominal interest rate:
(3) = 1ip’(j)
Using the Phelps-Auernheimer (Phelps, 1973;
Auernheimer, 1974) definition ofthe revenue, 1?,
we have
(4) R=ço(iJi,
and the marginal revenue is
(5)
di
Slime the elasticity of demand for real balances is
(6) N1 =_‘~‘y),
9(1)
the marginal weLfare cost per unit ofrevenue,
the ratio of equations 3 and 5, is
(7)dW N1
dl? i—Ni
Equation 7 is a variant of the welhknown Ramsey
tax rule (tax more heavily goods in inelastic
demand) and assumes, as does the Ramsey rule,
cross effects absent within the taxed sector. The
formula is useful in answering the question: What
rate of inflation (money rate of interest) would
equalize the marginal welfare cost per dollar
revenue accruing to inflation tax with an index
of such costs due to other distortionary taxes?
The analysis we are conducting is inthe realm
ofbalanced budget incidence. We raise the
inflation tax on real balances until the marginal
welfare cost per dollar of revenue is equal to an
index ofthese per dollar distortions for other
taxes. The increase in revenue is used by the
government for exhaustive expenditures rather
than rebated to consumers directly, or indirectly
through reduced taxes.
Another observation is in order. Although I
have illustrated the use of these formulas by
plugging in estimates of the marginal welfare
cost, the main contribution of the paper lies in
the provision of the formulas themselves. If
these formulas pass muster, other empirical
observations can be plugged in.
Assume the demand for real cash balances fol-
lows the Cagan semi-log form M/P = A exp(-bi).
Friedman (1971) uses three alternative values
of b, 5, 10 or 20. Laidler (1986) cites .15 as the
typical interest elasticity of demand for Mi. If
we assume the real rate is 1.5 percent, which
equals the money rate at zero inflation, the value
of b is .15/.015 or 10 percent. To err on the side
of charity to inflationary finance, we use a value
of 5 for b. Tower (1971) cites 10 percent as the
upper limitto the index of the marginal welfare
cost per dollar revenue for other distorting taxes.
This estimate is considerably lower than those
of Ballard, Shoven and Whally (1985), which
range from 17 to 56. We assume 10 percent as
the marginal welfare cost per dollar of revenue
for other distortionary taxes. Usingthe Cagan
function, we have in a currency-only world
(8)dw ib
dli 1—ib’
where dW/dfl = 51/(1-51) = .1 and i~ = .018. With
the realrate = 0,015, the ‘optimal” inflation rate
isapproximately zero. Given the parameter values
we have assumed, a very modest tax on real bal-
ances equalizes the marginal welfare cost per
dollar of revenue to an index of distortions due
to other taxes.
THE MARGINAL WELFARE COST OF
REVENUE: COMPETITIVELY PRICED
DEPOSITS ONLY
A variant of the above formula holds for a large
number of competitive banks subject to a
sterile legal reserve requirement, f, (Marty and
Chaloupka, 1988). An individual bank would
be forced by competition to pay (1-fii on its
The real rateof interest is h&d constant as the money rate
of interest, varies in such an an&ys~s (Marty, 1976)69
deposits where i is the yield on its assets. The
opportunity cost of holding deposits is then fi.
In a deposit-only world, the welfare cost becomes
(9) W=J~(x)dx-ifc(if).
The marginal change to welfare due to inflation is
(iOJç=fc(ifl-[ifc’(if)f+~(if)f] =-ifQ’(if)f.
In this case, revenue is
(11) R=fiço(if).
The marginal increment to revenue as the interest
rate changes, dR/di, is the bracketed term in




the marginal welfare cost per dollar increment
to revenue is
(13) dW/di — J\Jjf
dRidi l—J\cf
The authorities in a bank-only world can
set a money rate of interest equal to that in the
currency-only world divided by the reciprocal
ofthe reserve ratio, f. If the optimal money rate
in the currency world were 10 percent, that rate
can be set at 40 percent in aworld of deposits
(assuming the reserve ratio is 25 percent). Both
the welfare loss and the tax revenue, however,
are the same as in a currency-only world.
Although the tax rate (the money rate of interest)
is higher by the reciprocal of the reserve ratio, the
tax base is reduced by the share of high powered
money in the total money supplyJIM/fl.
Assume initially that the demand for deposits
has the same functional form as that for currency,
that the marginal welfare costs per dollar of rev-
enue for other distortionary taxes is the same as
in the world of currency, and that the reserve
ratio is 13 percent (realistic for the United States).
Since dW/dR = iJb/(1-iJb), we have .1 = 1(13)5/
[1 - I (.13)(5J] theni~ = 13.8 percent, which is equal
to the money rate in a world of currency, 1.8per-
cent, divided by the reserve ratio, 13 percent.
With the realrate equal to 1.5 percent, the
“optimal” rate of inflation is 12.3 percent.
THE MARGINAL WELFARE COST OF
REVENUE FROM INFLATION: CUR~
RENCY AND COMPETITIVELY PRICED
DEPOSITS
We now show that the aboveanalysis can be
extended to a world ofboth currency and deposits.
The demand function for each component is still
referred to as p, but they are potentially different
and the different measure ofcost, i or if, is used
to indicate this. The counterpart measures are
(14)W=[Jc(x)dx_ic(i)]+[JQ(x)dx_if9(if)]~














where C is currency, p(i), and Dis deposits, p(fi).
Once again, set the index of the marginal wel-
fare costs per dollar increment to revenue for
other distorting taxes equal to 0.1. Let the
reserve ratio be 13 percent and ratio of currency
to the money supply be 30 percent (the ratio of
bank deposits to money is then 70 percent).
These figures correspond broadly to ratios in
place in the United States for the early 1990s.
Again set the semi-log slope of the Cagan func-
tion equal to 5. Then we have dW/dR = [(,3) (51)
+, 7(.651) (-13)]/f(.3 -1.51) + .091 [1 (,13)(51)]} =
0.1. Then i~ = 2.28 percent. It should be noted70
that, although the formula is a weighted average
of currency and deposits, the currency weight
dominates the solution. While demand deposits
are 70 percent of the money supply, the tax base
is oniy the ratio of reserves to the money supply
—that is, 9 percent Given this low reserve
ratio, currency commands dominate weight.
The formula makes intuitive sense. If the rev-
enue ratio equals 100 percent, so that demand
deposits pay no interest and, assuming for sim-
plicity, that the demand function (ç) for deposits





in effect, currency and deposits are of the same
stuff.
On the other hand, if the reserve ratio is zero,
deposits produce neither seignorage nor a wed-
fare loss; we are, in effect, in a currency-only
world because the monetary authority receives




This again makes intuitive sense since only
currency is taxable.
Variants of the above formulas can be derived.
Consider, for example, a world in which an
effective prohibition on the payment of interest









This is similar to the formu’a in equation 20,
where deposits pay interest, but without the
reserve ratio, f, in the second term of the numer-
ator. If the reserve ratio equals zero and there is
no interest paid on deposits, bank deposits yield
no government revenue, but a welfare loss accrues
toboth currency and deposits. Ifthe reserve ratio
equals 100 percent, the interest prohibition on
deposits is unnecessary, but both currency and
deposits incur a welfare loss and both provide
seignorage. Once again, the formulas make
intuitive sense.
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY
The above analysis has imposed the zero-profit
condition that the return on interest-bearing assets
is paid out in interest on deposits. This condition
ignores the bank’s intermediation function, which
has a necess&y supply price. If the marginal costs
of intermediation are constant, the interest paid
on deposits is reduced by a given proportion.
Since the tax base (reserves) is independent of
intermediation costs, but deposits pay less interest,
it follows that we have underestimated somewhat
the marginal welfare costs and have erred on the
side of overestimating the optimal rate of inflation.
Although for purposes of exposition, the analy-
sis has in the main assumed that the demand
schedule for deposits is the same as that for
currency, all the formulas hold if the demand
schedule for deposits differs from that for cur-
rency. All one needs to do is change the form
of the function and plug in the relevant interest
elasticities. The formulas are general and can
be applied to economies with different indexes
of marginal distortions and varying interest
elasticities.
A potential problem in using these formulas
to predict dW/dR is that the ratio of currency
to deposits may change with the rate of inflation.
As an empirical matter, the currency~deposit
ratio has remained remarkably stable in the
United States since the period of financial de-
regulation in the late ‘SOs, when deposits began
paying explicit interest. Moreover, a theoretical
argument that the currency-deposit ratio is inde-
pendent of the money rate of interest has been
made by Dwyer and Saving (1086). As we have
seen the opportunity cost of holding currency is
the rate of interest, i, and the opportunity cost of
holding deposits is a fraction of the interest rate,
if. Assuming the indifference curve between
currency and deposits are homothetic, and that
the ratio of these opportunity costs is the appro-




determining the currency deposit ratio, this ratio
is independent of the money rate of interest.2
Although these formulas have been used to
assess dW/dR at hypothetical inflation rates,
which requires predicting the currency deposit
ratio, the formulas also can be used to calculate
the ox post measure dW/dR at a prevailing money
rate. All that is required is to observe the pre-
vailing currency-deposit ratio.
Finally, some caveats are in order. The analysis
deals with alternative positions of steady-state
inflation. It does not handle the welfare costs of
variable inflation—costs which may well be more
significant than those associated with steady-state
inflation. Moreover, our analysis has treated real
balances as part of an optimal tax menu; this usual
assumption is not without its critics (Lucas, 1986).
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2 This reasonThg, however! is not fuHy compelling. The ratio of
the price of sowbellies to that of caviar has the dimensionali-
lyof sowbeffles tocaviar and s ndependent of proporfionate
changes which leave the rSative price ratio unchanged.
The ratio of the opportunity cost of currency to that of
deposits s a dimens~offless number and taking the ratio of
the opporIun~ly costs (by analogy with commodWes) implies
that ones choice of currency and deposlis is independentof
the difference in theiropportunity costs.
Tatom (1979) makes an earfy attempt todetermine the
marginal we!fare costs per doflar of revenue in a world of
both currency and deposfts. Hetakes the ratio of the oppor-
tunity costs combined with homothetic indifference curves as
a compelling reason to treat the currency-deposits ratio as
independent of the inflaUon rate. More importantfy, Tatoni
does not buUd up h~s weffare costs from an explicit consider-
ation of the integral forcurrency and deposfts separately, but
conflates the two using a sirig!e integrat running from zero to
the money rate of interest. In fact, the integraf forcompeti~
Uvely priceddeposits should run from zeroto if. InterestingPy
enough, Tatoms analysis! although not general, applies to a
woild in which an effective prohibition on the payment of
nterest on deposits exists, and in which theform of the
demand schedute is the same for currency and deposits.
This is a special Case of myana$ys~s,and I am indebted to
John Tatomfor this reference and discussion.